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 Research on the partisan change that occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century 
has focused almost exclusively on partisan changes among white Southerners. The change from 
a solid Democratic to solid Republican voting bloc is well documented and the theories 
explaining the change are well known (e.g., Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Green, Palmquist and 
Schickler 2002). During the same time period another demographic group, Catholics, underwent 
a similar change. Once solidly Democratic, Catholics are now a swing voting group that both 
parties covet—about one-fourth of all voters in the 2012 election identified as Catholics 
according to exit polls.
1
 With a few exceptions (e.g., McDaniel and Ellison 2008; Penning 1986), 
the reasons for this change have largely gone unexplored.  
 The bulk of the discussion of the politics of American Catholics centers on abortion.  For 
example, in 2004, Archbishop Raymond Burke of St. Louis made headlines when he said that 
pro-choice politicians, like the Catholic Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry, should be 
denied communion.  In 2011, Archbishop Timothy Dolan of New York sent a letter to President 
Obama after the Department of Health Human Services denied a grant funding Catholic 
programs that aided victims of human trafficking.  H.H.S. ended the grant because the programs 
did not offer women contraception or refer them to abortion providers. 
 This tension between the Democratic Party and the Catholic Church would have been 
surprising to casual observers in the early 1960s.  Catholics were one of the strongest Democratic 
voting blocs.  The first Catholic presidential nominee, Al Smith, and the first Catholic president, 
John Kennedy, were both Democrats.  By the year 2000, however, Republicans had already seen 
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 In the 1970s, 23.7% of all NES respondents identified as Catholic.  In the 1990s, that number 
had risen to 25.2%.  While this increase is small, the difference is statistically significant 
(F=5.90; p<.02). 
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an increase in support among Catholics and the Republican candidate George W. Bush sent a 
letter to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops arguing that Republican policies on abortion 
and stem cell research were more in line with church doctrine (Hillygus and Shields 2008). 
 It is no surprise then that, when trying to explain declining levels of Catholic 
partisanship, many would start with abortion and reproductive rights issues (e.g., Adams 1997; 
Jelen and Wilcox 2003).  The focus on abortion, however, is similar to the focus on immigration 
among Latinos (Barreto and Pedraza 2009).  It implicitly assumes that the group is monolithic—
caring about only one issue and holding homogeneous attitudes on that issue—which causes the 
analyst to overlook factors that are potentially more important. 
We argue that the actual explanation for mass partisan change has less to do with 
attitudes towards any single issue and has more to do with where people live.  Abortion plays a 
role, but so does the partisan sorting on ideology that affected all citizens since the 1960s 
(Fiorina 2006).  Most importantly, analysts have overlooked the large role that contextual 
changes have played in the changing of mass partisanship.  Catholics are less Democratic now 
because fewer Catholics live in northern cities that are heavily Democratic and more live in the 
South and the suburbs which are more Republican.  Fewer Catholics receive predominantly pro-
Democratic messages in their communities and, as a result, fewer Catholics identify as 
Democrats. 
 This paper evaluates the contextual argument looking at partisan change among Catholics 
in the U.S. using the American National Election Study (ANES) to examine the changes in 
partisanship in Catholics from 1972 to 2000. We first show that more Catholics have moved into 
the South and the suburbs.  Next, we show that individuals living in those areas have become 
less likely to identify as Democratic.  Finally, we simulate Catholic partisanship if the contextual 
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changes had not taken place.  We show large differences between actual partisanship in the 
1990s and what partisanship would have looked like without the contextual changes. 
 
Previous Explanations for Partisan Change among Catholics 
Catholic membership in the Democratic Party peaked with the nomination of John 
Kennedy in 1960.  That year over seventy percent of Catholic respondents to the National 
Election Studies (NES) were Democrats. The link between the Democratic Party and Catholics, 
however, originates decades earlier. V.O. Key (1955) traces its origins in New England back to 
the party nominating the Catholic governor of New York, Al Smith, for president in 1928. As 
parties aligned during the New Deal, President Roosevelt’s appointments of Catholics to 
prominent positions helped ensure Catholics would form part of the Democratic coalition 
(Campbell et al., 1960). Catholics did not align with a party simply because of nominations and 
appointments. Catholics were different from most of the country in ways that set them apart and 
stimulated Democratic allegiance: they were poorer and more urban (McAvoy, 1942). 
 Poor, urban Catholics joined the Democratic New Deal coalition because of economic 
interests. They stayed members because their contexts – their neighborhoods and parishes – kept 
them Democratic. Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) note that many Catholics would drift 
to the Republican Party between elections, but the influence of their neighbors would bring them 
back to the Democratic Party when it was time to vote.  
The 1960 election of John F. Kennedy marked the zenith of the Catholic-Democratic 
alliance, but it would continue for the next few elections. A majority of Catholics backed Ronald 
Reagan, but Catholics still voted more Democratic than the rest of the country until the 1990s. 
Partisanship among Catholics is now similar to partisanship among non-Catholics. Forty-four 
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years after the nomination of John Kennedy, the Democrats once again nominated a Catholic 
Senator from Massachusetts. That year fewer than half of Catholic NES respondents identified as 
Democrats. 
What explains this change? The explanations given most often relate to issues. The 
arguments suggest that Catholic identifiers are more conservative and that as the Democratic 
Party moved left, Catholics adjusted their partisanship accordingly. For example, Abramowitz 
and Saunders (2006) argue the partisan change seen within many groups – including Catholics – 
is the result of conservative Democrats deciding that they were in the wrong party.  Arguments 
like this start with the observation that party elites have become more polarized in recent years 
(Hetherington 2002; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). With this increased polarization, it is 
easier for liberals and conservatives to recognize which party is liberal and which party is 
conservative. Once they notice the differences, individuals join the party that best represents 
their policy preferences.
2
 
Of particular importance in the discussion of Catholic partisanship is the issue of 
abortion. Prior to the Roe v. Wade decision, many Republicans led the pro-choice movement, as 
leading Democrats did not speak in favor of abortion rights out of deference to the Catholic 
members of their party (Stimson, 2004). After Roe, the party leaders took their now familiar 
stand on abortion, and Catholics bishops found themselves actively opposing some Democratic 
policies. Republicans took this opportunity to argue that their conservative platform – on 
abortion and other issues – was more in keeping with Catholic values (Leege et al., 2002).  
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 For an example of a similar argument in the British context see Milazzo, Adams, and Green 
(2012). 
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This could have affected partisanship because abortion had “evolved” as an issue 
(Adams, 1997). In the case of issue evolution, the changes in elite messages surround an “easy” 
issue.  Easy issues are largely symbolic which voters respond to at a “gut level” (Carmines and 
Stimson 1980).  When the parties take clear and distinct stances on that issue, then the public 
adjusts their views of the parties based on this issue (Carmines & Stimson, 1989).  Abortion is 
one of a number of “easy” issues that may have evolved in the second of half of the twentieth 
century as the parties have taken distinct stances on more issues (for a review see, Carmines & 
Wagner, 2006).  In the years following Roe, there became no doubt which party supports 
abortion rights. Hence, it would follow that many Catholics would identify the Republican Party 
as the pro-life party and leave the Democratic Party.  
While arguments surrounding abortion have some appeal, they do not tell the whole 
story. Even though the Catholic Church’s official stance is unequivocally pro-life, the 
membership is less so. In 2000, almost 40% of Catholic NES respondents said abortion should 
always be permitted. Half of George W. Bush’s votes among Catholics came from people with 
views that were sympathetic to abortion rights. If Roe explains Catholic partisanship, then these 
numbers do not make sense. On top of that, while the official church position on abortion is 
aligned with the Republican position, it is not at all clear which party would support the church’s 
position on other issues. For example, Gray, Perl, and Bendyna (2006) code a 2004 publication 
from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops outlining the church’s position on political issues. 
They find that more of the statements were aligned with Democratic positions, rather than 
Republican positions.
3
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 Grey, Perl, and Bendyna (2006) code the US Conference of Catholic Bishop’s pre-election 
platform from 2004 called: “Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to Political Responsibility”.  
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Moving Trucks and Partisan Realignment 
 Arguments about realignment due to issues or ideology ignore the important contextual 
changes that have taken place over the past 50 years. A contextual effect is “any effect on 
individual behavior that arises due to social interaction within the environment” (Huckfeldt & 
Sprague, 1993, 298). An individual’s neighborhood could affect political attitudes through 
interactions among neighbors (Segal & Meyer, 1969; MacKuen & Brown, 1987). If an individual 
moved, or if individuals with different ideas moved into the neighborhood, then contextual 
interactions would change, and therefore, the individual’s attitudes might change as well (Brown, 
1981). Even if the individuals who moved did not change their opinion of the parties, their 
children might view the parties differently since they are socialized in a new environment. 
The composition of the neighborhoods in which Catholics live has changed over the past 
fifty years. Following the Second World War, Catholics began moving into the suburbs. Greer 
(1961) noted this and argued this was part of the upward social movement of Catholics. At the 
time, Greer did not find any difference in party identification between urban Catholics and 
suburban Catholics. He did find that the suburban neighborhoods had more heterogeneous 
networks than Catholics in the cities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
They code 36 separate political positions from this document.  Of those 16 are coded as more 
aligned with Democratic positions and 7 as more aligned with Republican positions.  The 
remaining positions are not clearly associated with either party according to the authors.  Among 
the positions coded as Democratic are “welfare reform that reduces poverty and dependence and 
not cutting of beneﬁts,” “[addressing a] ‘culture of violence,’ [through] gun safety measures, 
reasonable restrictions on assault weapons and handguns,” and protecting the environment. 
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Since Greer’s writings, even more Catholics have moved to the suburbs and large 
numbers of Catholics have moved to the increasingly Republican South. In a later analysis, 
Penning (1986) emphasized issues and ideology as reason for changes in Catholic partisanship in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. He did find, however, that place of residence became an increasingly 
strong predictor of partisanship in the later periods of his analysis. 
 How would these contextual changes result in partisan change?  Social context can affect 
individual partisanship through a process of autoregressive influence (Huckfeldt, Johnson & 
Sprague, 2004; Huckfeldt, Johnson & Sprague, 2005). With autoregressive influence, every 
message is weighed against the other messages with consonant messages accepted and dissonant 
messages rejected.  Social network composition can explain why different individuals respond to 
changes in the information environment in different ways (Sinclair 2012).  For example, during a 
period in which most messages in the news are pro-Republican, individuals in Republican 
networks will hear similar messages from their friends and family and have stronger Republican 
views.  Individuals in more Democratic networks will be more likely to reject the pro-
Republican messages because they are not in accord with what they hear in their social networks.  
Hence, autoregressive influence could explain partisan change, but it could also explain partisan 
stability when likeminded partisans shielded each other from political tides that do not favor their 
party. 
 From the late 1960s into the 1980s, the policy statements of the Democratic Party and the 
Republican Party underwent several changes (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006).  We argue that 
how individuals responded to these changes was largely dependent on their social context.  If a 
Catholic lived or was born in an area that was favorable to the new Democratic positions, then 
the individual was likely to identify as a Democrat.  Many Catholics, however, now lived in 
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areas friendly to the new Republican Party positions.  These Catholics living in the South and in 
the suburbs are the Catholics who either left the Democratic Party or never joined. 
 To show that changes in context play a large role in explaining the declining association 
between Catholics and the Democratic Party, we need to show three things: (1) that Catholics 
lived in the South and suburbs in greater numbers between the 1970s and 1990s; (2) that the 
relationship between those variables and partisanship changed over the same time period; (3) that 
aggregate partisanship among Catholics would be very different without those contextual 
changes.  In the following sections, we present this evidence.  First, we describe our data 
showing how context and other factors change over time.  Second, we model the relationship 
between the key variables and partisanship including an interaction effect with year to show how 
the effect is conditioned on time.  Finally, we simulate what Catholic partisanship would have 
looked like if the contextual changes had never taken place. 
 
Data 
 We analyze the competing perspectives of partisan change using data from the American 
National Election Studies (ANES) between 1972 and 2000. The availability of measures relevant 
to the theories limits the analysis to these years. Until 1972, the ANES did not ask respondents 
for their position on abortion or their ideological self-placement. After 2000, the ANES did not 
include a variable measuring the type of neighborhood in which the respondent lived. 
The key dependent variable is partisanship measured via a three category variable 
indicating if the respondent’s party identification is Democratic, Republican, or independent. 
Scholars have shown that the strength of an individual’s attachment to a party can change over 
time (Fiorina, 1981). It is not clear, however, whether this change is meaningful, or if it is simply 
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the result of measurement error (Green & Palmquist, 1990). Our primary interest is in explaining 
why fewer Catholics are willing to say they are Democrats, therefore this measure will suffice. 
 Figure 1 shows the changes in Catholic partisanship over the last fifty years by 
generation. Some of the changes seen in aggregate partisanship are clearly the result of 
generational replacement. While previous generations began overwhelmingly Democratic and 
left the party, the most recent generation did not begin Democratic. In fact, they moved in a 
Democratic direction during President Clinton’s first term only to leave during the second. All 
three generations reach their low point in 2002, with the two younger generations at 
approximately forty percent Democratic and the oldest generation at just above 50% Democratic. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
We divide our independent variables into three sets: (1) demographics; (2) religiosity and 
ideology; (3) context.  These variables encompass the most likely suspects when trying to 
understand why the partisanship of group changed over a period of time.  In the next few 
paragraphs, we detail how these variables are coded—each is placed on a 0 to 1 scale.  
Additionally, Figure 2 and Figure 3 present percentages and means for each of these variables 
across the decades (1970s, 1980s, and 1990s).
4
  As we investigate possible causes for changes in 
mass partisanship among Catholics, it is important to look at how Catholics changed over the 
previous decades.
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Demographic Variables 
                                                          
4
 Please note that the y-axis scale changes in each panel of Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
5
 In the appendix, we replicate Figure 2 and Figure 3 for non-Catholics for readers who are 
interested in a comparison between the groups. 
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The variable Male is coded 1 if the NES respondent is a male and 0 if the NES 
respondent is a female.  The variables White and Hispanic are coded 1 if the respondent 
identifies as white or Hispanic, respectively.  As Figure 2 shows, males and Hispanics made up 
larger shares of Catholic identifiers in the 1990s than the 1970s.  The increase in Hispanics is 
accompanied by a decrease in the percentage of Catholic identifiers who are white. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 Education is coded 0 to 1: 0-the respondent did not graduate high school; .333-the 
respondent graduated high school; .6667-the respondent attended some college; 1-the respondent 
graduated from college.  The Income variable measures into which percentile the respondent’s 
family income falls: 0-less than 16
th
 percentile; .25 17
th
-33
rd
 percentile; .5 34
th
-67
th
 percentile; 
.75 68
th
 -95
th
 percentile; 1-greater than the 96
th
 percentile.   
As you can see, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the average education increased, but that 
was not met with an increase in income.  In fact, the income percentile in which the typical 
Catholic fell decreased—although, none of the pairwise comparisons are statistically 
distinguishable. 
Religiosity/Ideology 
In considering how Catholic partisanship has changed, it is important to consider how 
Catholics have changed: both in terms of their beliefs, but also in terms of their ties to the 
church.  We measure their ties to the church in two ways.  First, in line with social identity 
theory (Tajfel 1978), we examine in-group attachment using feeling thermometer ratings of 
warmth towards Catholics: the measure Thermometer in the second row of Figure 2.  This shows 
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no change in feelings towards the church across the decades.
6
  Note that the scandals involving 
priests sexually abusing children, which may have resulted in Catholics feeling less warm 
towards their church, were primarily publicized in the media after 2000.  Hence, any potential 
changes as a result of those scandals would not be reflected in this data. 
 Alternatively, one could measure attachment to the church by the frequency with which 
one is involved in church activities.  The two panels on the right side of Figure 2’s second row 
show the proportion of individuals who say they attend church weekly, Church Always, and the 
proportion who say they never attend church, Church Never. The excluded group is those who 
say they sometimes attend church.  This shows a significant change in activity.  In the 1970s, 
42% of Catholic identifiers said they attended church always. That number dropped eight 
percentage points in the 1980s and another two percentage points in the 1990s.  The percentage 
of Catholics saying they never attend church did not change much between the 1970s and the 
1980s, but there was a twelve percentage point increase between the 1980s and the 1990s.  This 
could be the result of actual changes in behavior or could reflect a simple willingness to admit to 
                                                          
6
 Social identity theory predicts that individuals will show in-group favoritism, out-group 
derogation, or both (Brewer and Brown 1998).  An alternative measure would be to take the 
difference between the feeling thermometer rating for Catholics and an out-group.  For this 
reason, we also took the difference between the feeling thermometer rating for Catholics and the 
rating for Protestant.  This does change over the years with the difference between the two 
ratings getting larger.  The result in Figure 2 suggests this change is more the result of more out-
group derogation over the decades than any change in in-group favoritism.  The other problem 
with this measure is that the feeling thermometer rating for Protestants was only asked in 1972, 
1976, and 2000. 
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not attending church.  Either way there seems to be a movement away from being practicing 
Catholics even as people still identified as Catholics. 
 The first two panels present other indicators of a declining religiosity among Catholic 
identifiers.  The Pro-Life variable is coded 1 if the respondent said that abortion should never be 
permitted or only if the life of the woman was in danger and 0 otherwise.
7
  As the figure show, 
the proportion of respondents who gave pro-life answers declined by almost twenty percentage 
points across the decades. 
 Bible: Literal combines two different measures.  In the 1980s, the measure is coded 1 if 
the respondent said, "The Bible is God's word and all it says is true", .5 if the respondent said, 
"The Bible was written by men inspired by God but it contains some human errors", and 0 if the 
respondent said that the Bible was written by men.  In the 1990s, the measure is coded 1 if the 
respondent said that the Bible should be taken literally, .5 if the respondent said the Bible is the 
word of God, but should not be taken literally, and 0 if the respondent said the Bible was written 
                                                          
7
 The sharp drop seen in 1980 could be the result of a question wording change. After 1980, the 
ANES added the words “by law” to the question. It is possible that individuals were making a 
distinction between what the law should allow and their own personal morals. In 1980, they 
asked both forms of the question and more than three quarters of respondents had the same 
position on both questions. However, individuals were eight percent less likely to take the pro-
life position when asked the question in the “by law” form. The ANES also added language 
about rape and incest that year. One would expect that this change could result in more pro-life 
respondents because it allows for more situations in which abortions would be allowed and have 
the respondent still coded as “pro-life”. 
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by men.  There is a .06 decline in the mean rating between the 1980s and 1990s again suggesting 
a declining religiosity among Catholics. 
 This decline in religiosity is not matched with increased liberalism.  The Ideology 
measure uses the standard ANES seven-point liberal conservative scale and puts it on a 0-1 scale 
with 0 indicating extreme conservatism and 1 indicating extreme liberalism.  There is a slight 
move across the decades in the conservative direction, but only the change from the 1970s to the 
1990s is statistically distinguishable from zero.   
Contextual Measures 
The final panel in Figure 3’s first row presents the first contextual measure: County 
Partisanship. This measure uses county partisanship measured by the Democratic share of the 
two-party vote in the respondent’s county (Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 2007).  We construct a 
z-score for each Catholic respondent by taking the partisanship of the Catholic respondent’s 
county and subtracting the mean county partisanship for all respondents in that year and then 
divide by the standard deviation of all county partisanships.  The positive values for all three 
decades indicate that the typical Catholic identifier lived and continues to live in a county that 
was more Democratic than the typical county through the time series.  An F-test of the difference 
of means indicates, however, that the Democratic partisanship in the counties in which Catholics 
live has declined (F=5.57; p<.02). 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 The other results in Figure 3 likely explain the change in the County Partisanship 
variable.  The South graph shows that 14% of Catholic respondents lived in a Southern state in 
the 1970s.
8
  The number increased to about 20% in the 1990s.  Meanwhile, the proportion of 
                                                          
8
 South is defined as a respondent who lives in a state that was a member of the Confederacy. 
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Catholics in urban locations declined while the proportion of Catholics in the suburbs increased.  
The South and suburbs saw an increase in Republican affiliation during this same period.
9
  
Hence, an increased Catholic presence in these areas would explain the decline in Democratic 
partisanship in the counties in which Catholics resided. 
 In the sum, these variables present the puzzle of changing mass-partisanship among 
Catholics.  Catholics become less white, more Hispanic, and less religious from the 1970s to the 
1990s.  Conventional wisdom would suggest that this should make them more Democratic and 
not less Democratic.  What then explains the decline in the percentage of Catholic Democrats?  
First, we do expect to see that as the parties became distinct ideologically, the more conservative 
Catholics were less likely to be Democratic partisans.  More importantly, we see in Figure 3 that 
Catholics moved into the South and the suburbs as these areas became more Republican.  We 
argue these are the individuals who identify with the Republican Party in the 1990s.  To test this 
argument, in the next section, we model Catholic partisanship from 1972 to 2000. 
 
Partisan Change from 1972 to 2000 
                                                          
9
 Among all ANES respondents, the percentage of Southerners identifying as Democratic 
dropped 7.9 percentage points from the 1970s to the 1990s.  Over that same time period the 
percentage of Southerners identifying as Republican increased by 11.4 percentage points.  
Among all ANES respondents, 48.7% of people living in the suburbs identified as Democratic in 
the 1990s.  That number fell 3.3 percentage points by the 1990s.  The more dramatic change 
came in Republican identification.  About 34.7% of ANES respondents who lived in the suburbs 
identified as Republican in the 1970s.  In the 1990s, 43.6% of suburban ANES respondents 
identified as Republican. 
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Our argument about why Catholic partisanship changed from the early 1970s to 2000 
rests on two factors.  First, Catholic identifiers changed in ways demonstrated in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3.  Second, the parties changed causing the relationship between certain variables and 
partisanship to change.  These temporal differences suggest the need for interaction effects. Each 
of the religiosity (abortion attitude and church attendance), ideological, and contextual variables 
is interacted with a time marker called Logged Year. We first code 1972 as year 1, 1974 as year 
2, and so on until 2000 is year 15 and then we take the natural log of this measure. Logged time 
is used because the most dramatic changes in the parties happened earlier on in the series. 
In addition to adding the Logged Year variable, there is also a change to note in coding of 
the ideology variables from Figure 2.  Ideology is captured by two variables.  Liberal is coded 3 
if the respondent is extremely liberal, 2 if the respondent is liberal, 1 if the respondent is liberal 
leaning, and 0 otherwise. Conservative is coded 3 if the respondent is extremely conservative, 2 
if the respondent is conservative, 1 if the respondent is conservative leaning, and 0 otherwise.  
We measure the variable in this way because the appeals Nixon and Reagan made directly to 
conservative Democrats may have disproportionately affected partisanship of conservatives 
(Leege et al. 2002).  Additionally we include a series of control variables.  The coding of these 
variables is available in the appendix.
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 presents the results of the multinomial logit model of partisanship from 1972 to 
2000 with coefficients for the Republican and independent categories.  The coefficients indicate 
                                                          
10
 We do not include the feeling thermometer variable from Figure 2 in this analysis because it is 
not available in all years.  We did perform some analyses using that variable.  We discuss those 
analyses in the Further Analyses section. 
16 
 
the relationship between that variable and the probability of being in that category. Positive 
coefficients indicate that a respondent is more likely to be a Republican or an independent; 
negative coefficients indicate the respondent is less likely to be in one of those categories.  
It is difficult to understand the substantive effects of a multinomial-model with 
interactions and for this reason, we present Figure 4 and Figure 5.  In these figures, we show the 
probability that a respondent is a Democrat for each of our key variables at the two ends of the 
time scale.  Figure 4 presents the results for our religiosity and ideology variables.  Figure 5 
presents the results for our contextual variables. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Religiosity and Ideology  
The first panel in Figure 4 presents the effect that abortion opinion has on the probability 
that a respondent is Democratic for 1972 and 2000.  The lighter bars are if the respondent is pro-
choice and the darker bars represent pro-life respondents.  At neither time period, are pro-choice 
and pro-life Catholics statistically distinguishable in the probability that they will identify as a 
Democrat.  The figure does show, however, the effect of the Democratic Party adopting the pro-
choice position following Roe v. Wade.  Pro-life Catholics are 12 percentage points less likely to 
identify as Democratic in 2000 when compared to 1972.  There is no statistical difference in the 
probability that a pro-choice Catholic will identify as Democratic over the time periods. 
 The other variables measuring religiosity are indicators of church attendance: the dummy 
variables Church Always and Church Never with the excluded category measuring individuals 
who occasionally attend church.  In the figure, increasing church attendance is marked by darker 
bars.  The figures show that church attendance now plays a smaller role in predicting 
partisanship.  In 1972, those who regularly attend church were 15 percentage points more likely 
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to report being Democratic compared to those who never attended church.  In 2000, there is no 
discernable difference in partisanship between Catholics who attend church and those who do 
not attend church. 
 There are two ways to interpret this result.  A social identification perspective (Green et 
al. 2002) would suggest that, in 1972, active Catholics believed the Democratic Party represented 
the beliefs of people like them.  By 2000, active Catholics no longer held this belief and, as a 
result, regular church attenders were no longer more likely to identify as Democrats.  
Alternatively, a social context argument would suggest that as Catholic churches became less 
homogeneously Democratic, individuals were less likely to receive messages from their fellow 
parishioners that were pro-Democratic.  Hence, attending church would no longer predict 
Democratic partisanship.  Further, individuals may no longer believe the Democratic Party 
represents Catholics because of a contextual affect.  We are unable to distinguish between the 
two mechanisms, but adjudicating between the two interpretations is beyond the goals of this 
paper. 
The final panel of Figure 4 examines ideology.  There is some evidence of the partisan 
sorting that took place after the parties clarified their ideological positions (Abramowitz and 
Saunders 2006; Fiorina 2006).  In 1972, there was a 52.5 percentage point difference in the 
probability that an extreme liberal would be a Democrat compared to an extreme conservative.  
By 2000, the effect of ideology had grown to 76.7 percentage points.  We must note, however, 
18 
 
that the confidence intervals on these predictions do overlap making it difficult to say 
conclusively that ideology plays a larger role in determining partisanship.
11
 
Contextual Variables 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 5 displays how the relationship between contextual variables and partisanship has 
changed from 1972 to 2000.  The first panel looks at the South variable.  Region is a strong 
predictor of partisanship throughout the series, but the effect has reversed its direction.  In 1972, 
southern Catholics were more likely to be Democrats than non-southern Catholics, but, by 2000, 
they were less likely to identify as Democrats.  This shifting of southern partisanship has been 
well documented, but it is an underappreciated cause of changes in Catholic partisanship.   
 What has received less scholarly attention is how the effect of urban context on 
partisanship has changed.  In 1972, there are no statistically distinguishable effects for living in 
an urban, suburban, or rural environment.  In 2000, there is a sharp divide between people who 
live in cities and those who live in the suburbs.  There is a 60% probability an urban Catholic 
will identify as a Democrat compared to a 50% probability that a suburban Catholic will do so.  
This change is largely due to the increasingly Republican suburbs.  The figure does not show 
this, but the probability of being a Republican in the suburbs doubled from 1972 to 2000. 
 
The Cumulative Effect of Changes 
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 We ran the same model on non-Catholics and in that specification ideology clearly plays a 
larger role in determining partisanship in later years with larger effects for the ideology variables 
in 2000. 
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 In Figure 2 and Figure 3, we showed how Catholics changed on key variables from the 
1970s to the 1990s.  In the previous section, we modeled how the relationship between those key 
variables and partisanship changed over the same time period.  If we are looking at changes in 
mass partisanship, however, we need to take both factors into account simultaneously.  For 
example, imagine more Catholics had a value of 1 on some dummy variable X at the end of a 
time series than they did at the beginning of the time series.  If that X variable is always a 
positive predictor of Democratic partisanship, then we could say that change led to increasing 
numbers of Democrats among Catholics.  If X became less associated with partisanship, then the 
increase in the percentage of Catholics with a 1 on X is potentially less relevant to explaining 
changes in mass partisanship. 
 For this reason, we perform a series of simulations to examine counterfactuals.  These 
simulations are similar in spirit to those run to understand the effects of knowledge on vote 
choice and policy opinions (e.g., Bartels 1996; Althaus 1998; Ryan 2010).  They examine 
hypothetical partisanship in the 1990s keeping all the variables and relationships at their 1990 
levels except for key sets of variables.  This allows us to estimate what partisanship would have 
looked like if some of the changes that took place over time had not occurred.  For example, 
what if the Democratic Party did not identify as the pro-choice party?  What if fewer Catholics 
had moved to the suburbs? 
 We carry out the simulation using the following steps. 
 We create fifty datasets that are identical to the ANES cumulative file for Catholics in the 
1990s. 
 For a set of variables—religiosity, ideology, or context—we replace respondent’s values 
on those variables.  We randomly assign values to respondents with probabilities 
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matching the probabilities of those values in the 1970s.  Note we do this for each set of 
key variables separately. 
 We change the coefficient of the interaction effects on those key variables to zero.  This 
means that the relationship between the variables and partisanship is the same as it was in 
1972—year 0 for the Logged Year variables.  All other interaction effects are unchanged. 
 We predict the probability that each respondent would be Democratic recording the mean 
probability for each of the 50 datasets that we created. 
What this allows us to do is determine what Catholic partisanship would have looked like 
a) if the changes in religiosity had not taken place, b) if the ideological changes had not taken 
place, and c) if the contextual changes had not taken place.  The largest difference between 
actual 1990s partisanship and simulated 1990s should suggest the variables that had the largest 
effect on mass partisanship among Catholics. 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 6.  The dotted vertical line on the left 
shows the actual mean probability of Democratic partisanship in the 1990s.  To the right are 
density plots of the mean probabilities from the simulations on the 50 data sets.
12
  The Figure 
shows that without the changes in ideology—both changes in the ideological positions of 
Catholics and the partisan sorting that took place—the average Catholic would be about 2 
percentage points more likely to identify as a Democrat.  This small effect of ideological changes 
on mass partisanship should not be that surprising.  While conservatives became less 
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 Please note, there are 50 data sets for each of the three sets of variables (religiosity, ideology, 
context).  Hence, we created 150 data sets total for the simulations. 
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Democratic, liberals became more Democratic; hence, the actual net effect on macropartisanship 
is small. 
The effect of religiosity is also small; it is about the same as ideology, with the mean 
from the simulations about half a percentage point higher.  With all the attention paid to abortion 
and declining religiosity, why did this not have a larger effect?  On the one hand, the changing 
Democratic positions did severe a bond with a strong voting bloc: active, observant Catholics.  
On the other hand, this is a group that shrank in numbers over the next twenty years.  Hence, if 
we are trying to understand the changes in mass partisanship among Catholics, the Democratic 
Party siding with the pro-choice movement had an effect, but not as large as one would think 
given the attention the issue receives. 
The differences between the simulated results and the actual vote share are the largest for 
the contextual changes.  According to the simulation, 62.5% of Catholics would identify as 
Democratic if the contextual changes had not taken place.  This is not simply the result of 
Catholics moving into the South and the suburbs in greater numbers.  It is the combined effect of 
Catholics moving into those areas while those areas became increasingly Republican. 
This suggests a larger point about the mass partisanship of all groups.  In some instances, 
party efforts to specifically target groups have a large effect—for example, the partisan changes 
around race in the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Huckfeldt and Kohfield 1989).  In other 
instances, groups make up a greater or lesser part of a party for reasons beyond policy positions 
alone.  For example, Claasseen and Povtak (2010) show that the Christian Right became a major 
player in the Republican Party less because of mobilization and more because of demographic 
changes. 
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We are not arguing that policy does not matter at all.  Our results suggest that the policies 
that Democrats took that cost them Southerners also cost them some share of the Catholic vote as 
well.  We are simply arguing that it is a mistake to argue that any particular policy or rhetorical 
appeal explains partisan change among a large group.  We use the word “Catholic” to group 25% 
of American public together.  Any group that large will be diverse in many ways.  Hence, the 
factors that explain changes in voting patterns among that group will also be complex and many 
of the factors that shape this group will also affect the larger public. 
 
Further Analyses 
 Any analysis attempting to explain mass partisan change over a thirty year period should 
be greeted with caution.  Data are rarely (if ever) available to test mechanisms.  The measures 
used are largely proxy measures and measures for alternative explanations may not be available.  
These concerns would apply to the current analysis as well.   
For example, we can show that where Catholics live plays a large role in explaining their 
partisanship.  We cannot show exactly how the contextual effect occurs.  We suspect it occurs 
through a process of autoregressive influence (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004).  Without 
either an experiment (e.g., Huckfeldt, Pietryka, and Reilly 2014; Ryan 2013) or close monitoring 
of individual conversations (e.g., Walsh 2004), we are unable to measure the different messages 
that are sent in different contexts. Further, even with all the controls, selection effects could drive 
the results—that is, individuals may choose to live in a particular context that better represents 
their partisan beliefs and thus the correlation between individual partisanship and political 
context is spurious (Achen and Shively 1995).  
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 As a robustness check, we conduct another analysis using Catholic respondents in the 
2000-2002 NES Panel data.  This does not directly test our argument about the mass partisan 
change over the past 30 years, but it does provide evidence for the mechanism that we suggest 
explains the contextual results. Following the attacks of September 11
th
, this time period saw an 
increase in Republican identification no doubt caused in part by the spike in President Bush’s 
approval (MacKuen, Erikson, Stimson 1989). The dataset also offers a measure of each 
respondent’s ego network in 2000 (for a discussion of ego network data see Klofstad et al. 2009). 
Hence, the model includes a measure of the respondent’s network prior to any change that might 
have caused the respondent to identify with a different political party in 2002.
13
 
 Between 2002 and 2000, 19.7% of Catholics reported changing parties.  Twice as many 
switched from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party than vice versa.  It is unclear if 
these changes are true changes in partisanship or simply the result of individuals wanting to say 
they identify with the party of the popular President Bush.  We model these changes using a 
structural equation model.  A full discussion of the structural equation model is available in the 
appendix. 
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 This does not necessarily demonstrate causality (Fowler et al. 2011).  For example, it is 
possible that those who are in disagreeable networks selected into those networks in part because 
they were most likely to change.  Further, the partisanship of the social network is measured 
using the respondents’ perceptions of their network which could lead to error.  Huckfeldt, 
Sprague and Levine (2000) demonstrate that perceptions of partisanship are typically correct.  
Further, as Sinclair points out in Fowler et al. (2011), the respondent’s perception of his or her 
discussion partners is the key variable since the respondent is reacting to his or her interactions 
with the social network and not the actual party attachments of the social network. 
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The results show that an individual’s social network in 2000 affects their partisanship in 
2002.  Moving from a network that was homogeneous in its support for Gore to a network that 
was homogeneous in its support for Bush would move an individual about 0.77 points on the 7 
point partisanship scale.
14
  This result controls for the individual’s partisanship in 2000 and is 
over and above the affect the network had on the individual’s 2000 partisanship.  Again, an 
analysis of individual level partisan change from 2000-2002 does not explain mass partisan 
change from the 1970s to the 1990s.  This analysis does suggest, however, that Catholic 
partisanship does respond to non-religious political events through the influence of social 
networks. 
 While we emphasize the importance of social context in explaining partisan change, we 
have paid less attention to the role of social identification theory.  The social identification theory 
centers on groups. It argues individuals identify with parties because the groups of which they 
are members are associated with those parties (Green, Palmquist & Schickler, 2002). For 
example, proponents of social identification would argue that members of minority groups tend 
to be more Democratic because of the associations between the Democratic Party and minority 
groups. If the association between a group and a party is severed—like the association between 
white Southerners and the Democratic Party—then the tie that a member of that group has to the 
party will also eventually be severed. 
 Measurement issues make it difficult for us to directly address this argument as the 
existing data do not provide us with a good measure of how strongly Catholics identify with their 
                                                          
14
 We conducted the same analysis using all ANES respondents. The effect in that analysis is 
larger—about 1 point on the scale—with a statistically significant effect for both the Gore 
Discussants and Bush Discussant variables. Those results are also available in the appendix. 
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Catholicism.  The measures of religiosity are potentially proxies for strength of Catholic identity.  
Hence, it is possible that the partisan change we attribute to disagreement over policy is really 
caused by a belief that Democrats do not care about Catholics in a way that they used to care 
about Catholics. 
 We attempt to more directly measure Catholic identity using the feeling thermometer 
ratings of warmth towards Catholics.  As we showed in Figure 3, the average feeling 
thermometer rating did not change from the 1970s to the 1990s.  This does not necessarily mean 
that this variable cannot explain the mass partisan change.  All that would be required is that the 
relationship between the variable and partisanship to change over the time period.  Hence, we 
would need a statistically significant interaction between thermometer and the Logged Year 
indicator to find support for a social identification hypothesis using the feeling thermometer 
rating. 
 We ran several models and none resulted in a statistically significant interaction effect.
15
  
Post-estimation analysis suggests the marginal effect of the feeling thermometer is consistent 
throughout the years.  Further, the feeling thermometer rating is a poor predictor of Democratic 
partisanship at every time point from 1972-2000.  The bivariate relationship between the feeling 
thermometer rating and partisanship is not statistically significant.  Again, this result does not 
mean that social identification theory does not explain some proportion of the partisans change 
among Catholics, but we cannot distinguish between a clear social identification effect and a 
religiosity effect using the available data. 
 
Conclusion 
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 These models are available in the appendix. 
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 When attempting to understand the mass partisan change of a demographic group, it is 
tempting to paint the group as a caricature or to believe the voices of the most vocal represent the 
viewpoints of the entire group.  For this reason, one might assume that Catholics are no longer a 
strong Democratic voting bloc because of the Democratic Party’s adoption of a pro-choice policy 
stance following Roe v. Wade.  U.S. Catholic Bishops clearly are unhappy with the Democratic 
Party’s abortion policy and Republican candidates have seen abortion and reproductive issues 
more generally as a potential area for making appeals to Catholics.   
Our analysis shows that abortion policy likely played a role in the partisan change 
experienced by Catholics.  We also show that partisan sorting explains some of the partisan 
change among Catholics as it does among voters more generally.  However, the effect of both of 
these factors plays a much smaller role than the effect of context.  We show that Catholics 
stopped being a solid Democratic voting bloc in the second half of the 20
th
 century largely 
because they no longer receive homogeneously pro-Democratic messages in their communities. 
Older Catholics have left the Democratic Party in recent years with most of those defections 
coming among Catholics who live in the South or the suburbs. In the 1980s and 1990s, these 
contexts became increasingly Republican. So, the messages received by Catholics living here 
became increasingly Republican and some were persuaded to leave the Democratic Party and 
younger generations never even identified as Democrats. 
 All of the most prominent theories of partisan change – issue evolution, social 
identification, and ideological realignment –place new information at the center of their models. 
All of these theories are agnostic, however, about how this new information is communicated. If 
most Americans are uninterested and uninformed, it seems unlikely that they would learn party 
positions on issues or whether parties are ignoring certain groups or what elites are saying. If 
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individuals are not going to receive the messages on their own, they are going to come from the 
people around them that are paying attention (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1948; Katz, 1957). 
This is why this contextual model explains the change so well. Instead of concentrating 
on the specific content of particular messages, it centers on which individuals are most likely to 
hear and accept the new messages—this is determined, in part, by an individual’s social 
surrounding (Sinclair 2012). What matters is the direction of the message – pro-Democratic or 
pro-Republican – not the issue the message addresses. For Catholics, the anti-Democratic and 
pro-Republican messages were heard most clearly in the increasingly Republican South and 
suburbs. Individuals may have been able to ignore them at first, but, as more and more of their 
discussions about politics had an anti-Democratic tone, those messages gained credibility. 
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Table 1. Multinomial Logit Model of the Partisanship of Catholic NES Respondents, 1972-2000 
    Republican   Independent 
    Coef. Z-Value   Coef. Z-Value 
Pro Life 
 
-0.312 -2.50 
 
-0.289 -2.21 
Church Always 
 
0.084 0.43 
 
-0.677 -1.76 
Church Never 
 
0.651 2.53 
 
0.022 0.08 
Liberal 
 
-0.950 -4.94 
 
-0.043 -0.21 
Conservative 
 
0.658 6.70 
 
-0.071 -0.24 
South 
 
-1.337 -3.46 
 
-0.263 -0.95 
Suburb 
 
-0.398 -1.57 
 
-0.359 -2.46 
Rural 
 
-0.092 -0.49 
 
-0.451 -1.97 
Logged Year 
 
-0.118 -1.36 
 
-0.579 -3.31 
Pro Life*Year 
 
0.191 2.04 
 
0.105 1.23 
Church Always*Year 
 
-0.138 -1.12 
 
0.323 1.66 
Church Never*Year 
 
-0.290 -2.75 
 
0.089 0.60 
Liberal*Year 
 
0.119 1.04 
 
-0.271 -2.59 
Conservative*Year 
 
0.047 0.67 
 
0.080 0.69 
South*Year 
 
0.704 3.83 
 
0.209 1.56 
Suburb*Year 
 
0.295 2.57 
 
0.254 2.82 
Rural*Year 
 
0.017 0.14 
 
0.305 3.03 
Birth Year 
 
0.011 2.64 
 
0.029 3.88 
Male 
 
0.352 5.54 
 
0.458 3.04 
White 
 
-0.043 -0.16 
 
-0.309 -0.64 
Hispanic 
 
-0.787 -2.49 
 
-0.677 -1.44 
Black 
 
-1.276 -3.04 
 
-0.572 -0.90 
Income 
 
0.952 3.89 
 
0.080 0.28 
Education 
 
0.615 5.45 
 
-0.336 -1.77 
Union  
 
-0.661 -8.37 
 
-0.258 -1.88 
Working 
 
-0.140 -0.72 
 
-0.502 -2.18 
Retired 
 
0.136 0.75 
 
0.090 0.30 
Homemaker 
 
0.198 0.92 
 
-0.323 -1.10 
Student  -0.241 -0.72  -0.852 -2.63 
Home Owner 
 
-0.089 -1.03 
 
0.102 0.97 
Married 
 
0.044 0.35 
 
0.322 2.35 
Divorced 
 
0.103 0.50 
 
0.104 0.51 
Widow 
 
0.066 0.28 
 
0.486 1.32 
Constant   -22.040 -2.79   -56.940 -3.85 
  
N=4,029 
 
A.I.C.=6532.974 
 
Notes. Standard errors corrected for clustering on survey year and sampling weights are used. Bold and italicized 
variables are statistically significant at the .05 level in a one-tailed test. Democrat is the excluded category. 
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Figure 1. Changes in Democratic Partisanship of Catholic NES Respondents By Generation, 
1960-2004. 
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Figure 2. Means of demographic, religiosity, and ideology variables by decade. 
A. Demographics 
 
 
B. Religiosity/Ideology 
 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 3. Means of contextual variables by decade. 
 
 
 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4. Predicted probabilities that Catholics identify as Democrats for religiosity and ideology 
variables. 
 
 
 
 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Probabilities calculated using estimates from 
model in Table 1. 
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Figure 5. Predicted probabilities that Catholics identify as Democrats for contextual variables. 
 
 
 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Probabilities calculated using estimates from 
model in Table 1. 
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Figure 6. Simulated partisanship if changes from 1970s-1990s had not taken place.  Figure shows 
densities of means from fifty simulations. 
 
